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THE ROLE OF CONSUMER PREFERENCE IN THE "LIKE GRADE
AND QUALITY" CONCEPT OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION

The role of consumer preference in the "like grade and quality"
provision of the Robinson-Patman Amendment,1 has received neither
clear nor consistent treatment by the Federal Trade Commission and
the courts. Although there was no specific mention of, nor provision
for, consumer preference within the Amendment, its use is implicit in
all antitrust statutes. This statutory scheme, of which the RobinsonPatman Amendment is a part, is basically directed toward protecting
and preserving competition. Competition is, of course, manifested in
the market place, where consumer preference plays such a large role.
The concept of consumer preference refers to the body of knowledge
and impressions, true or fancied, which the consumer applies to the
multitude of goods that compete for his dollars. It is his way of distinguishing between these products and determining which, and how
much of them to buy.
In a more specific sense, consumer preference, taken in the aggregate, determines the demand curves for each product-or how much
consumers are willing to buy at a particular price. Every pricing decision by a producer depends to a large extent upon the demand

curves that face his products. For a statute that purports to control
price discriminations, the concept of consumer preference is crucial
and must be interpreted and applied.2
The question that remains is that of determining how consumer
preference should be considered within the Robinson-Patman Amendment. There are two current interpretations: to consider it within the
jurisdictional test of "like grade and quality" or to treat it under a determination of "injury to competition." Our analysis will proceed
from the framework of "like grade and quality"-trying to make sense
out of the confusing legislative and court rulings that infer, discuss,
1. Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1973), formerly ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat.
730 (1914).

2. All antitrust statutes, which are designed to control the competitive situation
among producers in the market place, must be applied in light of the concept of consumer preference.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

or make direct use of consumer preferences. Since the second alternative, that of "injury to competition," did not surface until later in the
life of the Robinson-Patman Amendment, a comparative analysis is
delayed until the latter part of the discussion. Yet, the comparison is
of fair importance for the future use of consumer preference within
the Amendment.
I.

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF "LIKE GRADE AND QUALITY"LEGISLATIVE INTENT

In interpreting any statute, or any segment of a statute, we should
look first to the actual wording. Section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman
Amendment to the Clayton Act provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them. Provided, that
nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only
due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered.8

The use of the words "like grade and quality" implies several
conclusions. First, the commodities sold to different purchasers must be
comparable before the Amendment will apply to the sales, and "like
grade and quality" is the test. Second, if the commodities are not comparable in terms of grade and quality, a discrimination in price between the different purchasers is lawful and, indeed, the normal practice. Third, the Amendment requires a difference in both grade and
quality before a determination that the Amendment will not apply can
be made.4 Fourth, the Amendment is worded in terms of a pricing
3.

15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1973).

4. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COzmIITTEE To STUDY

THE -ANTITRUST LAWS 158 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORTI.
The minority position suggested that economic differences be evaluated under "grade"
and purely physical differences under "quality." Id. See also Comment, Like Grade and
Quality: Emergence of the Commercial Standard, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 294, 323 (1965).
Like "quality" will handle the problem of physical comparison; like "grade" will be used
to handle the subtle competitive problems. Id.
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policy. Perhaps then a plausible method for comparing the commodities for the purpose of this Amendment would be on the basis of
their cost of production. But the definition of "like grade and quality" must include factors other than cost of production. Finally, it
has been suggested that "like grade and quality" refers only to the physical nature of the commodities, 5 but it is not at all clear from the language of the Amendment that the term should be so limited.
It has often been noted that the legislative history of the "like
grade and quality" provision discloses little of the actual intent of the
draftsmen." Perhaps the best indication of their intent is found in the
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws:
The "like grade and quality" concept, we think, was designed to serve
as one of the necessary rough guides for separating out those commercial transactions
insufficiently comparable for price regulation
7
by the statute.
A brief analysis of the events surrounding the inclusion of the
"like grade and quality" provision in the Robinson-Patman Amendment is also of some help in interpreting the statute. The concept was
present in the original Clayton Act of 1914.8 That legislation was
concerned with the predatory practices of national trusts in selectively
slashing prices in certain localities to drive competitors out of business.
Section 2 of the Act exempted price differences made "on account of
differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold." 9
In the Robinson-Patman Amendment this term took on a new significance. Quantity was dropped from the provision. The term had provided a blanket immunity to quantity discounts granted large chain
stores. Smaller independents, not able to take advantage of these discounts, could not compete. Closing this loophole was the major impetus for the Amendment. 0 Grade and quality became a threshold
5. See FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 638-41 (1966), rev'g 339 F.2d 133 (5th
Cir. 1964).

6. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 157; F. RowE, PRiCE DISCRIMINATION UNDER
THE ROBINSON-PATDIAN ACT 65 (1962) [hereinafter cited as F. ROWE]; Cassady &
Grether, The Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade and Quality" Within the Meaning
of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-PatmanAct, 30 So. CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1957).

7.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT

157-58.

8. Clayton Act § 2(a), ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
9. Id.
10. Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the
Robinson-PatmanAct, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1956).
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question for the Robinson-Patman Amendment-placing the burden
upon the plaintiff to establish that the commodities in question were
of "like grade and quality" before proceeding with any evidence as
to competitive injury.
In general, there was an absence of debate on the subject of "like
grade and quality" in the legislative hearings that surrounded passage
of the Amendment. Yet, there was one particular debate" concerning
the inclusion of the word "brand" in the provision which is significant.
One draft of section 2 (a) would have made it applicable to the sale
of commodities of "like grade, quality, and brand."1 2 The inclusion of
this additional qualification was urged to protect the distribution of
privately branded products, for it was feared that price differences
between a manufacturer's nationally advertised brand and the private
brand of the same product would be prohibited by the Amendment.
The inclusion was denounced as a possible, serious loophole to the
effectiveness of the Amendment. The final consensus of the drafters
was that such inclusion would be as detrimental to the Amendment as
the criteria of "quantity" was to the original Clayton Act. Instead of
justifying lower prices offered to chain stores on the basis of quantity
discounts, the discriminating producer could attach a different brand
name to the commodity, and then justify the lower price on the basis
of "brand."
This criticism, however, was raised in response to the single situation of a producer who discriminates in price in favor of the large
chain store. It was felt that if identical products were to be sold under
a cheaper private brand, such privately branded products should be
available to all of the producer's customers. 3 Therefore, the criticism
of including "brand" in section 2 (a) was based more upon this con11. Hearings on H.R. 4995 Before the House Comm. on the judiciary, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 469 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 4995].
12. Id.
13. Id. H. B. Teegarden, counsel to the United States Wholesale Grocers Associa-

tion, who played a large role in the drafting of the Patman bill, denounced the inclusion as a serious loophole. Yet, he was not really concerned with the practice of selling
an identical product under a cheaper private brand. His concern was that the private
brand be available for all of the customers of the producers who compete.
Under the Patman bill as it stands, manufacturers are still free to put up
their products under private brands; but if they do so for one purchaser
under his private brand, then they must be ready to do so on the same
terms, relative to their competitive cost, for a competing purchaser under his
private brand ....

Id. at 469.
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cept of "availability"' 14 than upon a theory that physically identical
commodities should not be sold at different prices without cost justification.
II.

APPLICATION OF CONSUMER PREFERENCE TO "LIKE

GRADE

AND

QUALITY" IN THE CASE LAW

A. Commodities with Physical Differences
The concept of "like grade and quality" cannot-by the ordinary
meaning of its words-be restricted to the complete likeness of identical
products. Indeed, the decisions of the courts and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) have borne this out.15 But, what other factors will

be considered? It seems reasonable that beyond physical identity, commodities would be comparable in relation to how they are received in

the market place. The Attorney General's report speaks in terms of
"comparable private business transactions."' 1 One leading authority

in the antitrust field calls for a "commercial fungibility"'17 test. An
economic value or "market acceptance' 'i 8 test has been postulated, and
another writer has called for the "rule of reason inherent in the in-

terpretation of any act and in the case of the Robinson-Patman Amendment, a line of action which took account of the realities of the market

place. ' '

9

Regardless of the differences in these theories, they each rely

14. See von Kalinowski, Availability as a Defense to Private Label Marketing,
39 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 835 (1970). Von Kalinowski's theory is that if the lower
priced brand is available at the same price to all the retail customers of the producer
who desire it, there can be no price discrimination under the Act since there is no injury
to competition of the secondary line type. (Secondary line injury refers to competitive
harm to the customers of the producer, whereas primary line injury is harm to the direct
competitors of the producer.) Id. at 838.
15. See, e.g., Moog Indus. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S.
411 (1958) (per curiam). Three lines of automotive parts were sold to competing
customers. Some customers received discriminatory rebates. The Commission found the
parts "sufficiently comparable for price regulation by the statute." Id. at 50. In Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919
(5th Cir.), appeal dismissed on appellant's motion, 342 U.S. 875 (1951), cans of different sizes "were all of commercial grade and quality and gave substantially identical
performance." 87 F. Supp. at 987.
16. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 157.

17. F. RowE 74-76. The test is whether "the business community would as lief
take the one or the other for the same amount of money." Id. at 74-75.
18. Cassady & Grether, supra note 6, at 248. The test is one "in which reliance
is placed on the consumer-buyer evaluation of the products in determining whether
they should be considered alike or different." Id.
19. Knopp, What Are "Commodities of Like Grade and Quality"?, 1963 J.
MKTG. 63, 64.
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on consumer preference as a consideration in applying the Amendment.
There appears to be an internal consistency among the cases that
discuss consumer acceptance in its relation to the grade and quality of
the commodities being compared. In Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 20 the plaintiff was charged 'a higher price than a competitor
for a can differing only slightly in size. The court held that "the cans
were all of commercial grade and quality and gave substantially identical performance." 21 A case of similar purport is McWhirter v. Monroe
Calculating Machine Co. 2 2 At issue was the comparability of certain

business machines. Physical differences existed between the two machines, but the court recognized that they were both designed to perform the same general functions and were sold to the same purchasers
for the same kind of work. In the above two cases, one can recognize a
two-step procedure in satisfying the "like grade and quality" provision. First, the commodities are judged to be physically similar, and
second, determined to be functionally interchangeable.
The Champion Spark Plug Co.2 3 case continued this scheme.

Champion had sold a special brand of plug, having some minor physical variations, to Montgomery Ward & Co. at a lower price than its
usual Champion brand. The Commission was apparently satisfied that
the commodities were not of "like grade and quality" and did not inquire as to the functional significance of the variation. This case could
be considered a reversion from the principle established in Bruce's
Juices. Perhaps, though, the Commission had determined the physical
variations to be more substantial than the ones in Bruce's Juices and
McWhirter-sufficient to foreclose the use of the functional comparability test.
Boss Manufacturing Co. v. Payne Glove Co.,24 decided a few years

before the passage of the Robinson-Patman Amendment, may have
set the standard of physical disparity required to validate a price discrimination despite the further finding of functional interchangeability.
Similar gloves, distinguished only by the quality of material composing them, were sold under different brands. Regardless of functional
20. 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949).

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 987.
76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
50 F.T.C. 30 (1953).
71 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 590 (1934).
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quality."
General Foods Corp.2 5 represents the development of a third step,
in the procedure of satisfying the "like grade and quality" provision.
General Foods had been selling its institutional-pack Maxwell House
Coffee to some wholesalers at a lower price than it sold its grocery-pack
Maxwell House Coffee to other wholesalers. The institutional pack
contained an additional kind of bean to retain freshness for a longer
time. Also, there was some difference in the roasting process causing a
slight difference in color and taste. Regardless of these seemingly substantial physical variations, the Commission judged the coffees to be
of "like grade and quality." Not only were the coffees functionally
interchangeable, but there also was evidence that the differences between the two blends lacked commercial significance. The differing
blends were at times sold competitively, without a difference in consumer preference between the two. Apparently, the lack of differing,
consumer preferences goes a long way toward nullifying the effect of
physical differences.
Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC2 6 dealt with an alleged violation of
section 2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Amendment. More specifically,
Atalanta was guilty of granting promotional allowances in its line of
pork products to one of its customers without granting a similar proportional allowance to other competing customers. The "like grade
and quality" of the commodities being compared was a necessary element of the FTC's case in order to show that the customers of Atalanta
were entitled to equal terms. The hearing examiner had determined
the entire line of pork products to be of "like grade and quality"
solely on physical grounds since there was a common source for the
bacon, hams, and pork shoulders sold.27 On appeal, the Second Circuit considered the market significance of the pork products. In keeping with the analysis begun in Bruce's Juices, the court, finding the
commodities not physically identical, evaluated the commercial significance of the differences:
The test of products of like grade and quality was evolved to prevent
emasculation of the section by a supplier's making artificial distinc25. 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
26. 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958), reVzg 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956).

27. 53 F.T.C. at 568.
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tions in his product,
but this does not mean that all distinctions are
28
to be disregarded.
The court, however, appeared to discount the test of "interchangeability" because such a test "would expand section 2 (d) into a device
to regulate the entire business of a supplier." 29 If functional interchangeability were the test to be applied, ther the entire line of
pork products would be of "like grade and quality." Instead, consumer preference, as reflected in the prices of the pork products, was
the basis of the decision.
In Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC30 canned peaches, sold to various
wholesalers, were deemed to be of "like grade and quality" despite
the fact that the quality varied slightly according to where, when, and
by whom the peaches were grown and packed. The court determined
that the peaches were of commercial identity or fungibility,31 which
was all that the Robinson-Patman Amendment demanded for "like
grade and quality."
The plaintiff in Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp.3 2 charged
that Chrysler sold private automobiles equipped as taxis at unlawfully
low and discriminatory prices, financed out of profits from passenger
car sales. Chrysler justified rebates and lower-than-list prices to taxicab
buyers through physical differences (taxicabs have stronger batteries,
better brakes, stiffer shocks, less cushioning). The question that the
court considered was to what degree the physical differences affected
consumer use, preference or marketability. It said that
cross elasticity of demand, substitutability, physical appearance, and
identity of performance, are factors to be considered in determining
whether goods are of "like grade and quality." a
The three factors that control the cases of physically dissimilar commodities are present in the above statement: physical appearance, functional interchangeability (identity of performance and substitutability), and consumer preference (cross-elasticity of demand).
The case analysis in this section was presented to show the development of a three-step process for evaluating commodities in terms
28. 258 F.2d at 371.
29. Id.

30. 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 908 (1967).
31. Id. at 359. See F. Rowe 74-76 (commercial fungibility analysis).
32. 283 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

33. Id. at 888-89.
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of the, concept of "like grade and quality." The culmination of this
development is represented most clearly by the Checker case where all
three steps are observable. First, we look to the actual physical variations of the commodities at issue. If they are not substantial on their
face but neither are they insignificant, we must proceed to step two.
Checker follows this scheme, for the physical differences were significant, but their effect per se in relation to the entire automobile was
not clear. In step two we consider the functional interchangeability
of the commodities, where the test appears to be whether the commodities are reasonably interchangeable within the uses to which they
are directed. In Checker, the automobiles are reasonably interchangeable within the function of transporting people. Finally, as in Checker,
if step one and two are satisfied, then the third step, that of consumer
preference, becomes the deciding issue.
B. The Section 2(b) Defense of Meeting Competition
There is a distinctive use of consumer preference which can be
traced through several section 2 (b) cases applying the RobinsonPatman Amendment. Section 2 (b), which provides an affirmative defense to a violation of section 2 (a), has the following pertinent terms:
That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the
prima facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the
furnishing of services or facilities to any purchasers was made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the serv34

ices or facilities furnished by a competitor.

The provision, therefore, allows the producer to meet the low price
of his competitor, but not to undercut him.
The use of consumer preference is embodied in what may be
called the "premium product" rationale. It first appeared in Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,35 a case in which the respondent was

attempting to use -section -2 (b>- to defend -low-prices-given- to several
large customers for its heating control unit. The Commission found
that the respondent had developed large customer demand and public
acceptance for its controls which enabled it to sell at higher prices than
34. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1973).

35. 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

its competitors. It went on to say that if the section 2 (b) defense were
allowed here:
Any seller of a commodity which generally sells at a premium price
may freely discriminate among its customers so long as it does not
undercut the prices of competitors. Such an interpretation would
36
make the act largely unworkable ....
Standard Oil Co. 37 continued this premium product rationale. A
dealer in a major branded gasoline attempted to lower his price to the
same level as his unbranded competitor. There was a customary difference (usually two cents) in the price of gas between a major and
an independent dealer in any geographical area.38 If the major were
to reduce its price below that level, it would be considered an undercutting rather than a meeting of competition. In determining this
necessary price difference, the Commission said, "public acceptance
rather than chemical analysis of the product is the important competitive factor." 30
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 40 the Commission rejected the respondent's defense of meeting competition:
It is evident that Budweiser could and did successfully command a
premium price in the St. Louis Market ....The test in such a case

is not necessarily a difference in quality but the fact that the public
is willing to buy the product at a higher price in a normal market. 41
Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC42 furthers the idea behind the premium
product rationale. Callaway manufactured a "tufted" carpet which was
of a better quality and higher priced than an untufted carpet. In lowering the price of this tufted carpet to meet competition from untufted
manufacturers, Callaway was charged with a violation of the Amendment. The Commission, as cited by the court, rejected Callaway's 2 (b)
defense:
A discriminatory lower price set to "meet" the price of inferior goods
is in effect an undercutting of the latter price, and such a discrim36. Id. at 396-97.
37. 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
38. Gregory, A Survey of the Price Discrimination Aspects of the Federal Trade
Commission's Report on Gasoline Marketing, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 767, 785 (1968).
39. 49 F.T.C. at 952.
40. 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), vacated, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363
U.S. 536 (1960).
41. Id. at 302.
42. 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
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inatory price cannot be characterized43 as defensive, for it goes beyond
the provocation which engendered it.
The court framed its reliance on consumer preference in the following way:
[T]he public is greatly influenced by such intangibles as color, design,
display, advertising, and similar factors. So long as petitioners conclusively show that their products at various price levels generate
public demand (or "saleability") substantially equivalent to that of
competitors' carpeting at the same price levels, considerations of
"grade and quality" become unnecessary and indeed superfluous,
for
44
the most "grade and quality" can do is show "saleability."
It is evident from these section 2 (b) cases that the premium
product rationale incorporates not only the concept of quality, but
also the concept of consumer preference. The idea of a product being
itpremium" only has meaning with respect to the group which views
it as such. In the section 2 (b) cases, this group is composed of all potential consumers of the commodities at issue, and such consumers
evaluate these products on the basis of their own preferences.
C. Physically Identical Commodities-The Borden Case
The development and use of the concept of consumer preference
within the test of "like grade and quality" was apparently disregarded
by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Borden Co.45 Borden sold evaporated
milk under its own brand, which was nationally advertised, and under
the private brands of several large retailers. The milk sold under the
retailers' brands was physically and chemically identical with that sold
under its own brand. It sold, both at wholesale and retail levels, at
prices regularly below those of the Borden brand. There was substantial evidence of a decided consumer preference for the Borden brand
over the private brands. The Supreme Court reinstated the FTC's
determination that the commodities were of "like grade and quality."
The Commission's decision had been reversed by the Fifth Circuit
based on a belief that:
In determining whether products are of like grade and quality, con-

sideration should be given to all commercially significant distinc-:
43.
44.
45.
381 F.2d

Id. at 440.
Id. at 441.
383 U.S. 637 (1966), revtg 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964), enforcement denied,
175 (5th Cir. 1967).
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tions which affect market value, whether they be physical or promo46
tional.
In making its decision the Supreme Court relied substantially on
the majority position within the Attorney General's report. 47 Both the
majority and minority positions of the report recognized the economic
disparity between the value of the branded and unbranded commodities in the market place (such disparities having been created primarily
through national advertising). However, whereas the minority position
would take this disparity into account through the requirement of
"like grade and quality" (where the burden of proof rests on the
plaintiff), the majority position would rather; consider it under a
"flexible" concept of either "competitive injury" or a "cost justification" defense. 48 A majority of the Attorney General's committee believed that
abandonment of a physical test of grade and quality in favor of a
marketing comparison of intrinsically identical goods might not only
enmesh the administrators of the statute in complex economic investigations for every price discrimination charge, but also could encourage easy evasion of the statute through artificial variations in the
packaging, advertising or design
of goods which the seller wishes to
49
distribute at differential prices.
The Supreme Court added two other considerations in its denial
of the market comparison test. First, it mentioned the "brand inclusion" controversy that appeared in the record of the hearings on the
Patman Bill. 50 As previously discussed in section II, dealing with legislative intent, this brand controversy involved a preliminary draft of
section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Amendment which would have
read: "like grade, quality, and brand." This draft was denounced and
defeated in the legislative hearings. The Supreme Court considered
this denouncement and defeat to mean that brand was not a valid criterion to be used in evaluating commodities for the purpose of this
Amendment. Second, the Court discussed the Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. 51 case that was decided by the Commission when the RobinsonPatman Amendment was in its formative stages. Goodyear sold a large
46. 339 F.2d at 137.

-47;-

See-ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT

158-59.,

48. Id. at 159.

49.

Id. at 158-59.

50. See Hearings on H.R. 4995, at 421.

51. 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936), rev'd on other grounds, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939).
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quantity of its tires to Sears and Roebuck bearing Sears' Allstate
labels. The tires were judged to be physically identical with tires sold
under a Goodyear brand, although they were sold at a significantly
lower price to Sears. The case was decided under section 2 of the
Clayton Act,5

2

in which differences in grade, quality, or quantity were

a defense. The Commission, using a physical comparison test, found
the tires to be of like grade and quality and disallowed that part of the
defense. 53 It discounted testimony which established substantial consumer preference for the nationally advertised Goodyear brand.
It is clear that the Supreme Court, following the lead of the
FTC, intended to make physical identity a threshold issue for a determination of grade and quality. If commodities that are being discriminated against according to price (by one producer) are deemed
to be of the same physical and chemical composition, the requirement of "like grade and quality" is met. The Court felt that:
Such transactions

are too laden with potential discrimination

and adverse competitive effect to be excluded from the reach of
§ 2(a) by permitting a difference in grade to be established by the
label alone or by the label and its consumer appeal. 54
By making physical identity a threshold issue, the Court, as the
Commission before it, was applying a double standard in its use of consumer preference. For cases in which the commodities are not physically identical, consumer preference has often been the deciding factor in evaluating "like grade and quality." 55 Thus, in these situations,
52. Clayton Act § 2(a), ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
53. 22 F.T.C. at 290. The respondent, however, did not challenge the Commission
on the issue of grade and quality. Instead, Goodyear argued the case on the basis of
the quantity defense. Id. at 286-90. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Goodyear's defense was successful. 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939). Therefore, the issue involved in
this case is not strictly comparable to the use of consumer preference under an affirmative finding of like grade and quality.
54. FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 643-44 (1966). See text accompanying
note 49 supra for a statement of the position of the majority in the Attorney General's
report.
55. See text accompanying notes 25-33 supra. Also, the concept of consumer preference is used to compare commodities for the purposes of the section 2(b) defense of
meeting competition. Under this defense consumer preference has been applied to determine when a producer is actually meeting the low price of his competitor and when
he is undercutting such price. This is not directly analagous to the postulated "double
standard" because that standard only appears in relation to the section 2(a) concept
of "like grade and quality," -but it still represents a major use of consumer preference
when the commodities are physically identical. In contrast, the Court will not apply
consumer preference under "like grade and quality" when dealing with such commodities.
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"like grade and quality" has not been limited to physical comparisons.
However, the concept was so limited, and consumer preference was
not even considered, when the Court came across a case where the
commodities were physically identical. Such a position is inconsistent
with our physically dissimilar cases and contradicts the usual and natural definition of the words themselves.' 6
D. The Attorney General's Report, as Accepted by the Supreme
Court in Borden
The important-issue here is the placement of consumer preference
under a "flexible" concept of "cost justification" or the "inquiry into
competitive harm"-as opposed to its incorporation within "like grade
and quality." The majority position of the report and the Supreme
Court in Borden have both recognized that consumer preferences
which have "manifest themselves in real price margins as between the
branded and unbranded products the buying public is willing to
pay" 7 must be considered in determining if there is a violation of
section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Amendment. Yet, they refused
to consider this consumer preference under the concepts of "like grade
and quality"-electing instead to consider it under the above mentioned "flexible" concepts.
A major impetus for this refusal on the part of the Court and the
FTC is related to the previously discussed "brand controversy."5 8 The
inclusion of brand in the concept of "like grade and quality" was denounced in the legislative hearings. The Court and the FTC have
accepted this denouncement as unqualified and complete. As a result,
brand is not to be considered within a section 2 (a) evaluation of
grade and quality. Nonetheless, a closer look at this denouncement reveals that the conclusion should be qualified. It was narrowly directed
at the then current abuses of large chain stores, with massive buying
power, which were able to extract discriminatory prices from producers.
So, in effect, the legislators were concerned only with differently
branded commodities that were commercially interchangeable (would
sell at the same price). Such brand classifications represent a difference
in name only, and not in economic value within the market place,
which is to be measured by consumer preference.
56. See note 4 supra.

57.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT

58. See note 13 supra.
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The defense of "cost justification" is wholly inadequate in dealing
with consumer preference. The basis for its use is that any consumer
preference which exists between physically identical branded and unbranded goods is a result of substantial national advertising and piomotion of the branded article. Such an identifiable expense could, then,
justify the differences in prices charged by the producer. The dissent
0
in Borden"
guggested two reasons why such a procedure would not
work effectively: (1) cost data in a large company, such as Borden,
would be hard to separate, prove, and allocate to the specific branded
sales; and (2) advertising costs do not have a direct relation to consumer demand-thus a pure cost justification defense would not account for all the differences in consumer preference.6 0
In line with the second reason, we should look at the words of
the Amendment:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manu-

facture, sale, or delivery .... 61
The phrase make "only due allowance" seems to restrict the "cost
justification" defense to those price differences which reflect the varia62
tions in cost, dollar for dollar.
It is an important, but little understood, fact that in all good
faith the differentials in prices in ordinary business, between related
but separate commodities, cannot be expected to bear any close correlation to the 63differences in costs of making and selling those separate
commodities.
This is true because prices are set in accordance with consumer demand, or the price a consumer will be willing to pay for a particular
product. Varying consumer demand is based upon a differentiation of
the products. The basis for such differentiation may be real or fancied;
the only requirement is that the differentiation is important to the
consumer and leads to a preference of one commodity over another.
Cost of the product, on the other hand, depends on the nature and
59. 383 U.S. at 648 (Stewart & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).

60. Id. at 659.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
62. See Smith, The Patman Act in Practice, 35 MIcH. L. Rv. 705, 711-12
(1937).
63. Id. at 722.
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efficiency of the production process. It may be found to "increase in
uneven jumps, depending on the points at which the processes of
manufacture require changed and additional effort, special attention,
or new processes." 64 The effects of advertising on consumer demand
are highly elusive and easily can reach a point of diminishing returns.05
In our specific case, where advertising expense is to be related to the
higher price of the advertised commodity, it can readily be seen that
the effect of advertising on consumer demand, which controls the
price, may not have the direct, proportional relationship that the terms
of the defense require.
Passing now to the "flexible" concept of "competitive injury," we
find there is a violation of the Amendment
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition ....
6
On remand to the Fifth Circuit, the case against Borden was quickly
dismissed for failure to find an injury to competition. 7 The court
could find no causal relationship between the price differential and
the alleged competitive injury.0 8 Apparently, the phrase "effect of
such discrimination" was interpreted to mean that the differences in
the prices alone must be the cause of the injury. A possible undercutting of competition by the unbranded sale was not considered to
be a sufficient cause. Therefore, a subsidy relationship must be found,
such that the unbranded commodity is selling below cost, and the loss
is being subsidized by the branded sale. Such a relationship was absent
in Borden.
The Fifth Circuit went further in talking about a possible competitive injury:
We are of the firm view that where a price differential between
a premium and nonpremium brand reflects no more than a consumer
preference for the premium brand, the price difference creates no
competitive advantage to the recipient of the cheaper private brand
product on which the injury could be predicated.0 9
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Jordan, Robinson-PatmanAct Aspects of Dual Distribution by Brand
of Consumer Goods, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 394, 398 (1965).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
67. 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967).
68. Id. at 180.
69. Id. at 181.
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The test of competitive injury then becomes whether or not the price
difference has exceeded the difference of consumer preference. This
test makes due allowance for the concept of consumer preference in
the treatment of physically identical commodities. However, it was
postulated as dicta and has yet to be affirmed or denied by a definitive ruling. Such a test could well be incorporated in the "like grade
and quality" provision to provide a uniform treatment of consumer
preference.7 0 Likeness, in terms of "grade and quality" of physically
identical commodities, would then be a function of their competitive
positions in the marketplace. The prices to be charged for these variously branded commodities would be determined by this concept of
"likeness"-resulting in legal price discrimination.
III. ECONOMIC

DISCUSSION OF CONSUMER PREFERENCE

A. Cross-Elasticityof Demand
In general, cross-elasticity of demand is a measurement of how
the price change of one commodity affects the sales of another. The
numerical rendering of the concept is determined by dividing the
percent change in the price of commodity A into the percent change
in the quantity of commodity B purchased as a result of A's price
change. When the elasticity is found to equal zero, the commodities
are completely independent of each other. As the elasticity increases
from zero, the commodities compared have become more and more
easily substituted, for each other. Negative elasticities refer to complementary goods.71 An example of complementary goods might be fishing licenses and fishing poles, where an increase in the price of licenses
may tend to decrease the purchase of poles.
The application of cross-elasticity of demand to antitrust litigation appeared definitively for the first time in United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co0 2 The allegations involved a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act 73-a charge of monopolizing interstate
commerce in the sale of cellophane. At issue was the determination of
70. See text accompanying notes 104-07 infra. See also Medow, Differences in
Costs and Brand Valuation as Justification for Private Label Prices, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 857 (1970).
71. See generally E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS THEORY & APPLICATIONS
92-94 (1970).
72. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
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the relevant competitive market. Du Pont argued that the relevant
market should be composed of all flexible packaging material of which
cellophane constituted 17.9 percent. The government contended that
the market must be restricted to cellophane alone. Du Pont controlled
75 percent of the United States market in cellophane, a percentage
large enough to sustain a charge of monopolization. The test employed
by the Court was:
If a slight decrease in the price of cellophane causes a considerable
number of customers of other flexible wrappings to switch to cellophane, it would be an indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand4
exists between them; that the products compete in the same market.7
Following this test, the Court was convinced by du Pont's arguments
that the sales of other flexible wrapping materials, such as cellulose and
aluminum foil, were significantly affected by slight changes in the
price of cellophane. The relevant product market was then found to
include all flexible wrappings.
There is a basic analogy between the determination of the relevant product market for the purposes of the Sherman Act, and the
determination of "like grade and quality" for physically dissimilar
commodities under the Robinson-Patman Amendment. The concept
of the relevant competitive or product market was at first defined
"narrowly to consist of only physically indistinguishable products." 75 A
test of functional interchangeability came next, in which products that
were not physically identical could still perform an identical function.7
The test of functional interchangeability is said to be one of degree:
products are interchangeable despite slight differences in use, but become non-interchangeable as the disparities increase.71 Finally, in
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,78 a concept of reasonable interchangeability which included cross-elasticity of demand was
recognized in the determination of a relevant product market:
For every product, substitutes exist. But a relevant market cannot
meaningfully encompass that infinite range. The circle must be drawn
74. 351 U.S. at 400.
75. Comment, Determination of the Relevant Product Market, 26 OHno ST. L.J.
241, 248 (1965).
76. See United States v.Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916),
appeal dismissed on appellant's motion, 249 U.S. 621 (1919).
77. Note, The Market: A Concept in Antitrust, 54 COLUmn. L. REV. 580, 587
(1954).
78. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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narrowly to exclude any other product to which, within reasonable
variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will turn; in
technical terms, products whose "cross elasticities of demand" are
79
small.
The determination of the relevant product market, after the TimesPicayune and du Pont cases, involves the consideration of two basic
factors: (1) the uses or function to which the products can be put; and
(2) the purchaser reaction to the products (measurable by cross-elasticity of demand).
As we have just seen, cross-elasticity of demand is acceptable as
an evaluation of the purchaser reaction in the product market determination. We can then take the analogy one step further and apply
cross-elasticity to the evaluation of purchaser reaction in the "like
grade and quality" determination. In at least one case a court has
mentioned this concept as a factor to be considered in determining
"like grade and quality," but did not evaluate any empirical evidence. 0
The concept of cross-elasticity is readily adaptable to cases of "like
grade and quality." It shows the "likeness" of commodities in the eyes
of the purchasers by rating their substitutability between zero and plus
or minus infinity. Thus, cross-elasticity is the numerical rendering of
consumer preference between the two commodities being compared.
There are several other reasons which favor its use. First, it is a precise
measure of consumer preference, or at least as precise as an empirical
market study can be. Consumer preference is a nebulous term, difficult to explain and apply--cross-elasticity gives it structure and form.
Second, it could replace the multitude of phrases now used to describe
"substitutability,"8 2
consumer preference: "commercial identity,"8'
"substantially equivalent saleability," 83 and "commercial fungibility."8 4
Third, cross-elasticity provides a continuum from complete independence (zero) to complete interchangeability (approaching infinity). A
court could then decide at what point along the continuum the com79.
80.
1968).
81.
390 U.S.
82.
1968).
83.
84.

Id. at 612 n.31.
Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 876, 888-89 (S.D.N.Y.
Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 1966), revd in part,
341 (1968).
Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 876, 888 (S.D.N.Y.
Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1966).
Fred Meyer, Inc. v4 FTC, 359 F.2d at 359 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd in part.

390 U.S. 341 (1968).
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modities will become so interchangeable as to result in a finding of
"like grade and quality."
Cross-elasticity of demand is not limited to physically identical
goods or even physically similar goods, as we saw in du Pont. But the
wording of the Amendment, the intent of the framers, and past judicial interpretations have limited the consideration of "like grade and
quality" to goods that are at least physically similar.8 5 Thus, in cases
decided under section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Amendment, the
concept of cross-elasticity would have to be applied within the limits
of physically similar commodities.
B. General Economic Situation of Borden-Economic Integrity of
Consumer Preference
Consumer preference in reality determines economic value, that
is, the relative value of all commodities as they appear in the marketplace. Such value is not a function of cost but rather of consumer desires-preferences as demonstrated by buying choices.88 In criticising
the Supreme Court decision in Borden, most commentators have focused on two things: (1) the statement in the Attorney General's
Report that the criterion of "like grade and quality" is meant to
reasonably confine the Amendment to "comparable private business
transactions"; and (2) the general proposition that all antitrust legislation should be interpreted in line with the competitive situation
within the market. The frame of reference for evaluating "like grade
and quality" should, therefore, be the market, where economic value,
not physical identity, is the relevant concept. 8
Continuing with this economic analysis of the Borden case, we
should look at the general economic situation in which Borden found
itself. The situation appears to be one of monopolistic competition as
85. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT. The "rough guide" explanation used in
the Attorney General's report denotes physical likeness as a limit for "like grade and
quality."
86. See Jordan, supranote 65, at 401.
87. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 157.
88. See Cassady & Grether, supra note 6, at 256-73 (a market acceptance test as
opposed to a physical comparison test was postulated); Schiffman, Like Grade and
Quality: The Borden Case, 5 Am. Bus. L.J. 185, 190 (1967); Comment, supra note
4, at 296. See also F. RowE 75-76; Knopp, supra note 19, at 64. Knopp developed a
"rule of reason" theory which should be "inherent in the interpretation of any act
and in the case of the Robinson-Patman Amendment, a line of action which took account of the realities of the market place." Td.
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defined by Edward Chamberlain, in his treatise on that subject.8 9 He
said that traditional economic theory has offered both a theory of competition and a theory of monopoly:
If the product is fairly individual, as the services of an electric street
railway, or if it has the legal stamp of a patent or a copyright, it is
usually regarded as a monopoly. On the other hand, if it stands out
less clearly from other "products" in a general class, it is grouped
with them and regarded as part of an industry or field of economic
activity which is essentially competitive.90

The product that Borden is selling under its brand name is fairly
individual because it has been differentiated to a large extent from
other similar products through national advertising. The extent of the
differentiation is evidenced by the substantial consumer preference
for the Borden brand over the private brand milk. The results of such
differentiation are that "buyers are given a basis for preference, and
will therefore be paired with sellers, not in random fashion (as under
pure competition), but according to these preferences." 91 Borden is
also in a competitive situation, however, because there are other producers selling nationally advertised branded milk which can be found
to be more or less interchangeable for the Borden brand. Borden can
exercise pricing independence only to the extent that its brand is differentiated from the other brands. Any further pricing policy will have
to be made with regard to its competitor's response. This dual nature
of the market in which Borden sells its milk is the essential ingredient
of monopolistic competition.
Borden, as a representative of a firm in monopolistic competition,
wants to increase its profit. What are its legal alternatives? First, it
9 2 of its
could lower its price below the "differentiation barrier"

branded competitors, thus attracting customers away from those competitors. But such a procedure is likely to result in an equal reduction
by the competitors, and all companies will end up selling at a lower
price, realizing a lower profit on the same share of the market. Sec89. E. CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY oF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE (1946). Chamberlain was the first to develop the
concept of monopolistic competition.
90. Id. at 57.
91. Id. at 69.
92. The term "differentiated barrier" refers to the difference in consumer preference between two similar commodities (which is reflected in the market prices). Such
consumer preference has been created primarily through advertising in an attempt on
the producer's part to differentiate his product.
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ond, Borden could offer a product considered to be better by the public
by improving its quality or adding beneficial ingredients. It is common
practice to make minor improvements the subject of a new advertising
campaign in an attempt to attract the customers of competitors. This
procedure would probably: (1) be matched and, in effect, nullified by
competitors; and (2) be subject to diminishing returns. 3 Third,
Borden could offer selective price reductions to its largest retail
purchasers in an attempt to have them push its products at the expense
of competitors. Such price reductions would take the form of promotional allowances or rebates. If done secretly and sporadically, it is
04
unlikely that the effect could be completely matched by competitors.
However, such a procedure is illegal as violative of the RobinsonPatman Amendment.
A final possibility is for Borden to differentiate among its own
products. The best way to do so is to offer for sale a private branded
edition of its own branded product, which would not incorporate the
consumer preference developed by the national advertising. In the eyes
of the consumers, the private brand is not of the same quality. It appeals to a separate group of people who constitute a separate market.
This bit of market subdivision has been recognized to have economic
effect by a leading analyst of imperfect competition:0 5
Various brands of a certain article which in fact are almost exactly
alike may be sold as different qualities under names and labels which
induce rich and snobbish buyers to divide themselves from poorer
buyers; and in this way the market is split up, and the monopolist can
sell substantially the same thing at several prices.06
Since Borden is able to sell its evaporated milk in these separate markets, it would be to its economic advantage to be able to sell at different prices. As we have seen, Borden sells both in a market which
closely resembles perfect competition and in a market which is to a
large degree monopolistic. For a market in perfect competition, the
93. See Jordan, supra note 65, at 398-99.
94. Id. at 399.
95. J. ROBINSON, THE, ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 179-202 (1933).
Mrs. Robinson, who wrote in 1933 before Chamberlain's theory of monopolistic competition was formulated, talked exclusively about the price discrimination that was used
by a monopolist. The monopolist was the only producer in the position to find "it
possible and profitable to sell a single commodity at different prices to different buyers."
Id. at 179. Borden, although not strictly a monopolist, has a degree of monopoly power
-measured by how effectively it has been able to differentiate its product.
96. Id. at 180-81.
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demand curve facing any individual producer is a horizontal line. Each
firm occupies such a small portion of the market that any decision on
its part to sell or hold back will have no influence on price. However
the situation in the branded market is quite different. Here, Borden
has a degree of monopoly power and can adjust the selling price within
the range of that power. The demand curve in this branded market
decreases as it moves to the right, indicating that as the quantity of the
item offered for sale increases, the price that can be charged decreases.
Such a demand curve allows Borden to exercise some control over
the price to be charged in contrast to the perfect competitive situation.
Therefore, Borden has to be allowed to discriminate in its pricing
policy, in order to achieve profit maximization in each market-the
97
goal of our economic system.
Another way to look at the Borden situation is to assume that
Borden is faced with a decreasing average cost curve-as the quantity
produced increases each item costs less. Such a situation is generally
the result of excess capacity. 9 We have seen that Borden may not have
been able to increase quantity through the ordinary means of decreasing the price or through additional advertising to attract new customers.
The solution then is to seek a high volume outlet which will involve
little selling or advertising expense, and to sell in that outlet at prices
equal to or greater than average total cost (total cost of producing
each item) -competition in this outlet or market being based primarily upon price.99 If this can be achieved, Borden will have increased
its profit in the branded market because the cost of producing each
item is less. In the unbranded market, by selling at a price equal to
average total cost, Borden will break even. 100
Both of these models justify, through an economic analysis, the
price discrimination involved in the Borden case. These analyses have
relied heavily upon the levels of consumer demand in the branded and
97. For a technical explanation, see id. at 184-85.
98. M. ADEiLMAN, A&P: A STUDY IN PRICE COST
145 (1959).
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99. Id. at 144. The quantity sold in the high volume outlet would be limited to
excess capacity, which is determined by the output measured at the point where average
total cost equals marginal cost less the quantity sold in its branded market. Id.
100. It is economically feasible for Borden to price below average cost in the unbranded market-as long as the increase in profit in the branded market exceeds the
loss of revenue. However, such a situation would be viewed as a subsidy and result
in a violation of the Robinson-Patman Amendment if there were any injury to competi-

tion.
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the unbranded markets. Such consumer demand is of course determined
by the way in which consumers view the products offered for sale, translated into relative preferences among them. Thus, consumer preference
is a persistent economic factor that must be taken into account in any
comparison of commodities sold in the marketplace.
IV.

COMPROMISE SUGGESTION FOR THE TEST OF "LIKE

GRADE

AND QUALITY"

Final judicial action in Borden was completed in 1967, and the
result still governs the situation today. The Fifth Circuit on remand
took some of the bite out of the Supreme Court's decision by making
it relatively easy for a producer such as Borden to demonstrate that its
price differences were not the cause of any alleged competitive injury.
The producer only needs to show: (1) that there is a significant difference in consumer preference with regard to the two commodities being
compared so as to justify the price difference, 1 1 and (2) that there was
no subsidy arrangement between the two commodities--that the sale of
the unbranded commodity could stand on its own. 102 But the Supreme
Court's determination that consumer preference will not be considered
in deciding the jurisdictional question of grade and quality for physically identical commodities still has force.
The argument given in this article is based upon the apparent
preferability of incorporating consumer preference into the "like grade
and quality" provision. However, the Supreme Court, citing the Attorney General's report, holds to the contrary:
[E]conomio factors [referring to consumer preference] inherent in
brand names and national advertising should not be considered in the
jurisdictional inquiry under the statutory "like grade and quality"
3
test.10
The Court appears to be concerned because a finding of "like grade
and quality" ends any further application of the Amendment, with the
result that the real purpose of the Amendment and all antitrust
statutes-to protect competition-will not even be considered. Physically identical commodities are considered suspect; consumer prefer101. 381 F.2d at 181.
102. Id. at 177, 181.
103. 383 U.S. at 645-46.
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ence, tending to show diversity, will only be evaluated during an inquiry into competitive harm.
A compromise interpretation of "like grade and quality" exists
which can accommodate the concept of consumer preference with the
Supreme Court's position. First, consideration must be limited to those
commodities which have at least similar physical compositions. Such
a limitation is in line with the discussion of the terms grade and quality,10 4 and conforms to the case material previously discussed. Second,
a finding of substantially similar consumer preference between physically similar commodities will be enough to defeat the ordinary presumption of disparity, which surfaced in the analysis of the cases in
section III. 105 Third, a considerably greater presumption of "likeness"
will be created in cases of physically identical commodities. This
greater presumption can be defeated by a demonstration_of a significant difference in consumer preference, plus a determination that the
price difference results in no "injury to competition."
In general, this double requirement is intended to pacify the
"suspicions" of the Supreme Court, but still include the concept of
consumer preference within "like grade and quality." Specifically, this
procedure is necessary in order to cover a particular situation where a
producer, marketing both a nationally branded and an unbranded
physically identical commodity, is selling his unbranded commodity at
a lower price than could be justified by consumer preference. If we
were to consider only consumer preference, the "like grade and quality" jurisdictional question would be answered in the negative and all
inquiries would stop. Yet, such a situation could engender a great
deal of competitive harm. The prime example is that of the fighting
brand, introduced in a particular locality where the producer's nationally advertised brand is competing with other nationally advertised
brands. Although each competitor has differentiated his branded product to some degree, he is not operating in a complete monopoly situation. As the price of the fighting brand is reduced below the economic
difference based upon consumer preference, customers will be attracted away from the branded commodities. 106 The producer could
104. See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
105. See notes 16-33 supra & accompanying text.
106. See Jordan, supra note 65, at 410-11. The fighting brand does not necessarily have to be selling below cost-just below that price justified by consumer preference. See also Medow, supra note 70.
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continue this procedure until he has driven the competing brands out
of the market, at which time he would withdraw the fighting brand.
Clearly, this is an injury to competition.
The advantages of this "compromise suggestion" are persuasive.
First, it incorporates the concept of consumer preference into "like
grade and quality." Second, it gives uniformity to this use of the concept. Third, it offers some guidance for the way the concept should be
applied in controversial situations. Fourth, it provides a, common
ground for agreement between the Supreme Court's position (basically
in line with the FTC decisions concerning consumer preference) and
the multitude of authorities who call for a strict commercial standard
in evaluating "like grade and quality.
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107. See, e.g., F. RowE; Cassady & Grether, supra note 6; Knopp, supra note 19.

